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Abstract      
 
When the interest rates were approaching zero in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, the 
major central banks of the global economy adopted the use of so-called unconventional monetary 
policies. Of the unconventional monetary policy tools, the large-scale asset purchase programmes, also 
called balance sheet policies, are the most prominent one and their popularity has not declined, on the 
contrary. The monetary responses of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve (Fed) to 
the latest global crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic, confirmed this as balance sheet policies were introduced 
once again.  
 
The global financial crisis is seen as the turning point for monetary policy for especially the major 
central banks such as the ECB and the Fed. For this reason, the causes behind the crisis and subsequent 
ramifications are discussed in this thesis. The transition from conventional monetary policies to 
unconventional policies is shown and the monetary transmission mechanism, through which the 
monetary decisions affect the economy and asset prices, is explained.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis measures the announcement effect of ECB’s asset purchase programmes on two 
major stock indices: STOXX Europe 600 and S&P 500. The announcement effect is tested with event 
study methodology. In order to silence the unwanted noise from other macroeconomic news that might 
compromise the results, a relatively short estimation period of 30 days is chosen for the event study and 
is placed right before the event window. Abnormal returns are then calculated over the three-day event 
window of [-1,1]. The results show that the announcement effect of ECB’s asset purchase programmes is 
significant and yields positive cumulative abnormal returns on both STOXX Europe 600 and S&P 500 
indices over the three-day event window. 
 
Finally, through discussion, this thesis argues that we are witnessing a paradigmatic change in central 
banking as policies once classified as unconventional have been used over the conventional ones’ ever 
since the financial crisis. This is especially true with the ECB as it has kept the key interest rates of the 
euro area close to zero for years and no change is visible on the horizon. 
 
Keywords      
Abnormal returns, announcement effect, European Central Bank, unconventional monetary policy  





1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... 6 
1.1 Previous studies .......................................................................................... 8 
2 BUILDUP OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS..................................................... 10 
2.1 Moral hazard on the financial market ................................................... 10 
2.2 The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis ......................................................... 11 
2.3 Credit crisis and bankruptcies of large financial companies ............... 13 
2.4 European sovereign debt crisis ............................................................... 15 
2.5 Ramifications from the financial crisis .................................................. 17 
3 MONETARY POLICY OF CENTRAL BANKS .......................................... 19 
3.1 The role of the central banks................................................................... 19 
3.2 Tools of conventional monetary policy ................................................... 20 
3.2.1 Key interest rates............................................................................. 21 
3.2.2 Open market operations .................................................................. 23 
3.2.3 Discount windows and standing facilities....................................... 24 
3.2.4 Reserve requirements ...................................................................... 25 
3.3 Tools of unconventional monetary policy .............................................. 25 
3.3.1 Signaling and forward guidance ..................................................... 27 
3.3.2 Quantitative Easing (QE) ................................................................ 28 
3.3.3 Credit Easing (CE) .......................................................................... 29 
3.3.4 Consequences from the balance sheet policies ............................... 30 
4 MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM .......................................... 32 
4.1 Monetary policy and stock prices ........................................................... 34 
4.1.1 Market efficiency ............................................................................ 35 
4.1.2 International integration of stock markets ...................................... 36 
5 DATA AND METHODOLOGY ..................................................................... 38 
5.1 Data collection and description ............................................................... 38 
5.1.1 STOXX Europe 600 and S&P 500 ................................................. 38 
5.1.2 ECB’s asset purchase programmes ................................................. 41 
5.2 Event study methodology ........................................................................ 46 
5.2.1 Events of interest............................................................................. 47 
5.2.2 Estimation period and event window .............................................. 47 
5.2.3 Measuring normal returns ............................................................... 48 
5.2.4 Measuring abnormal returns ........................................................... 49 
5.2.5 Measuring cumulative abnormal returns ........................................ 50 
5.2.6 Measuring the statistical significance ............................................. 51 
5.2.7 Possible problems with event studies ............................................. 52 
6 RESULTS .......................................................................................................... 54 
7 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 56 
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 59 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. List of ECB Refinancing Rate changes. ...................................................................... 65 








Figure 1. Gross debt (% of GDP) of chosen countries. ................................................................... 16 
Figure 2. ECB Refinancing Rate and Federal Funds Target Rate between 01/2008-12/2020. .... 22 
Figure 3. Total assets of ECB (€) and Fed ($) between 2017-2020. ................................................ 30 
Figure 4. Market efficiency in case of new information. ................................................................. 36 
Figure 5. STOXX Europe 600 index between 01/2008 and 12/2020. .............................................. 39 
Figure 6. S&P 500 index between 01/2008 and 12/2020. ................................................................. 39 
Figure 7. Estimation window and event window. ............................................................................ 48 
 
TABLES 
Table 1. APP overview.  Monthly net purchases and holdings in the end of 2020. ...................... 46 
Table 2. Events of interest. ................................................................................................................ 47 





The financial crisis of 2008 can be seen as a turning point for monetary policy, when 
major central banks were forced to change the means of monetary policy as the so-
called conventional monetary tools were insufficient to respond to the shock and 
subsequent economic recession caused by the crisis. This is especially true with the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve (Fed) of the U.S., as these 
central banks decreased their key interest rates to a point, where the zero bound of 
interest rate was reached. The zero bound of interest rate is a macroeconomic problem 
after which no further interest rate cuts are possible without the rate becoming 
negative. Indeed, when the interest rates approach zero, the tools of conventional 
monetary policy are not effective anymore. In such an environment the use of 
unconventional monetary tools, large-scale asset purchases in particular, is the most 
effective way to conduct monetary policy. 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate how the means of monetary policy have 
changed after the financial crisis and what repercussions have followed since. 
Furthermore, the short-term effect of ECB’s asset purchase programmes on stock 
markets is examined to see whether the channels of unconventional monetary policy 
transmission mechanism work under the assumptions of the efficient market 
hypothesis. Stock prices are a good way to test the efficient market hypothesis and the 
effectiveness of monetary transmission channels, as they are highly sensitive to any 
changes in the economic conditions. In addition, the international integration and co-
movement of stock markets is studied by comparing the effects on the European stock 
market (STOXX Europe 600 index) and on the U.S. market (S&P 500 index). 
The research questions are as follows: 
1) Have the so-called unconventional monetary tools displaced more 
conventional ones in the ECB monetary policy toolkit? 
2) Do ECB’s asset purchase programme announcements have a statistically 
significant announcement effect for STOXX Europe 600 and S&P 500? 
3) If an announcement effect is found, are the short-term abnormal returns 
positive or negative?  
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4) Do the STOXX Europe 600 and S&P 500 respond to these announcements 
similarly? 
5) Which hypotheses could explain results? 
To answer the first research question, the monetary policy of ECB and possible 
limitations of it are discussed throughout the thesis. To answer other research 
questions, quantitative research is conducted using the event study methodology. The 
event study is a commonly applied method to measure the impact of a specific event 
on stock prices. The event study is applied to determine, whether abnormal returns 
occur around the events, which are the dates, when the ECB has introduced its asset 
purchase programmes to the public. Abnormal return is the difference between the 
actual asset return and the predicted asset return.    
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Following subchapter 1.1 presents the 
previous studies concerning the announcement effect of large-scale asset purchase 
programmes to stock markets. Chapter two deals with the financial crisis and crises 
that have followed since. This chapter creates an important introduction to why the 
means and tools of central banking have gone through a paradigmatic change in a 
relatively short time period. Furthermore, the aftermath of the financial crisis is briefly 
discussed. Chapter three assembles both the conventional and the unconventional tools 
of central banks and compares the post financial crisis usage of them between the ECB 
and the Fed. The monetary transmission mechanism of unconventional monetary 
policies is described in chapter four. Furthermore, this chapter presents the link 
between monetary policy and stock prices and presents the existing assumptions of 
efficient markets and the co-movement of international stock markets. Chapter five 
describes the event study methodology and gives description of the data used in the 
event study of this thesis. The results from the event study are presented and discussed 
in chapter six. Chapter seven concludes the thesis and sets out the expected direction 




1.1 Previous studies 
Existing literature suggests that large-scale asset purchase programmes tend to have a 
greater impact on asset prices in periods of high financial stress. However, Altavilla et 
al. (2015) provide support for the view that the effects of asset purchases are not 
limited to times of financial market stress, but more on the strength of monetary 
transmission mechanism through channels of transmission. As long as the channels of 
transmission are strong, we can compare purchase programmes that have occurred at 
different times under different market conditions. 
Fratzscher et al. (2014) study the short-term impact of the ECB’s unconventional 
monetary policy measures on the asset prices in the euro area and globally. They also 
test the transmission mechanism of monetary policy through a number of transmission 
channels including the portfolio balance channel. Using daily data over the period of 
May 2007 to September 2012, they find that both the announcement and subsequent 
operations of Securities Market Programme (SMP) and Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) create positive spillovers to global equity markets. However, as 
Fratzscher et al. compare their results against the previous results from the U.S. 
markets, they conclude that the positive spillovers from ECB’s policies are more 
limited than the ones from Fed’s policies, suggesting that the U.S. plays a more 
prominent role in the global financial cycle than Europe. 
Using an event study method, Haitsma et al. (2016) examine the stock market reaction 
to ECB’s policy announcements between 1999-2015. Their results suggest that 
especially unconventional monetary policy surprises affect the Euro Stoxx 50 index 
and that the price reaction is largest among the past loser stocks. Furthermore, Haitsma 
et al. show that the value stocks are affected more by the unconventional monetary 
policy announcements than growth stocks. Kontonikas and Kostakis (2013) receive 
similar results from the U.S. market. 
Georgiadis and Gräb (2016) study the announcement effect of ECB’s Asset Purchase 
Programme (APP) on global equity prices. The APP is the ECB’s first QE programme 
and the announcement was given on 22 January 2015, when the ECB announced that 
it will engage in monthly purchases of €60 billion worth of sovereign bonds until at 
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least September 2016. Georgiadis and Gräb find that the APP announcement boosted 
equity prices around the world by supporting investor confidence and reducing the risk 
of deflation and persistent stagnation in the euro area. They find that the APP led to a 
significant abnormal return of 3.94% on advanced economies and to a significant 
abnormal return of 4.13% on emerging markets Furthermore, Georgiadis and Gräb 
find evidence that, as the message of the APP was so strong, investors rebalanced their 
portfolios by reducing the weight on emerging markets and increasing the weight on 
advanced economies’ financial markets. As such, the cumulative response of advanced 
economies increased to almost 11%. 
However, the relationship between monetary policy and stock prices is not so 
unambiguous that expansionary monetary announcements (i.e., lowering short-term 
interest rates, conducting asset purchases) would necessarily lead to a positive stock 
market reaction and that contractionary monetary announcements (i.e., increasing 
short-term interest rates, reducing asset purchases) would necessarily lead to a negative 
stock market reaction. Kerssenfischer (2019) argues that while the ECB’s surprise 
announcements have strong effects on bond yields and exchange rates, the impact on 
stock prices and other economic expectations is puzzlingly small and often 
controversial. Using high frequency futures data to isolate market reactions to ECB’s 
monetary policy announcements, Kerssenfischer shows that after a supposedly 
contractionary shock (i.e., rising interest rate) unemployment falls, growth and 
inflation expectations rise and also stock prices frequently rise rather than drop.  
Kerssenfischer justifies these results by stating that, rather than just changing market 
participants’ expectations on current and future path of monetary policy, these 
announcements also reveal the central bank’s economic outlook. As such, if a central 
bank reveals favourable information about the economic outlook while rising interest 
rates (or reducing the quantity of asset purchases), stock prices should rise as the main 
message would be that the economic conditions are strong enough to raise interest 
rates. 
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2 BUILDUP OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Macroeconomists often remind us that financial crises are a natural part of business 
cycles and that they are bound to perhaps even to human nature itself, as behavioral 
biases, such as moral hazard with excessive risk-taking, tend to play an important role 
behind the genesis of such crises. However, the global financial crisis of 2008 was 
particularly intense and changed the fundamental foundations and methods of central 
banking. Structural weaknesses in the global financial system, severe relaxation of 
lending and the partial dysfunction of the interbank money markets are commonly 
identified causes behind the plunge of the global financial markets in the autumn of 
2008. 
2.1 Moral hazard on the financial market 
Moral hazard played a central role behind the incidents that eventually collapsed 
financial markets into a deep and fundamental crisis in the autumn of 2008. A moral 
hazard is a behavioral bias in which one party is responsible for the interests of the 
other party, but the responsible party has an incentive to put their own interests first. 
Financial examples from moral hazard include actions and thoughts such as 1) I might 
sell you a financial product (e.g., a mortgage) knowing that it is not in your interest to 
buy it, 2) I might take risks that you then have to bear and 3) I might pay myself 
excessive bonuses out of funds and assets that I am managing on your behalf (Dowd, 
2008). Such examples of moral hazard situations are a pervasive feature of the 
financial system and market economies in more general. Moral hazard increases the 
counterparty risk (also known as the default risk) which is the risk that one of the 
companies or individuals included in the transaction is unable to make the required 
payments. 
The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis is an excellent example of moral hazard occurrence 
on the market. Prior to the crisis, in the “old days”, a bank had an incentive to hold the 
granted mortgage to maturity and thus screened and selected the borrowers carefully 
as default of the mortgage holder would make a loss to the bank. Because of the high 
possibility of default, subprime mortgages were not attractive from the lender’s point 
of view. However, if a lender originates a mortgage with an intention to sell it on (i.e., 
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securitizing it), the incentive of not letting the borrower default loan payments is 
seriously weakened (Dowd, 2008). With these weakened incentives, the subprime 
mortgage loans appeared appealing to lenders. This Ponzi scheme originating from 
moral hazard and securitization of high-risk financial assets kept going as long as the 
house prices rose in the United States. Eventually, interest rates started to rise while 
simultaneously house prices plunged, and this drove the market participants who were 
involved in the high-risk subprime mortgages to troubles.  
2.2 The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis 
Prior to the meltdown of the financial markets, commercial banks and other financial 
institutions in the United States had indulged in risky behavior with excessive lending 
of credits. The biggest individual dilemma was that banks agreed mortgages without 
proper guarantees, which created a housing bubble in the U.S. economy. Brunnermeier 
(2009) states that the main reason that helped to create the massive housing bubble in 
the U.S. was the low interest rate environment that the Federal Reserve adopted in the 
aftermath of the internet bubble burst at the beginning of the millennium. Furthermore, 
large capital inflows from abroad affected heavily on the U.S. interest rate environment 
creating further pressure. Inevitably, the loose monetary policy of the Federal Reserve 
resulted in upward trending inflation, which created pressure on interest rates to rise 
as bond holders sought compensation for the rising inflation level. The Federal Funds 
Target Rate, which is the Federal Reserve’s main tool to guide market interest rates, 
rose from 1.01% to 5.26% between July 2003 and July 2007. The unhealthy housing 
markets did not hold in such a high interest rate environment and as the subprime 
mortgage crisis broke in the summer of 2007, the Federal Reserve began to lower the 
Federal Funds Target Rate once again. 
Low interest rate environment of the early 2000s encouraged investors, such as 
investment banks and pension funds, to engage in mortgage financing, which resulted 
in substantial increases in house prices. As subprime mortgages offered higher yields 
than standard mortgages, they were popular amongst investors as through 
securitization it was possible to mitigate risk and to shift a major part of the risk to 
other market participants. In the securitization process, the issuer designs a marketable 
financial instrument by pooling various financial assets into one group. The assembled 
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instrument is then offered to investors on the secondary market. Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDOs) are a good example of complex and pooled financial derivatives, 
that were used in market speculation. The combination of low lending standards and 
cheap credit created a housing frenzy in the U.S. planting the seeds for the financial 
turmoil. Laucbach and Williams (2015) find that the natural rate of interest has 
decreased and remained near zero ever since the Great Recession of 1929. This 
suggests that the low interest rate environment around the time of the U.S. housing 
bubble was not caused by the lax interest rate policy of the Federal Reserve but was 
rather created by low GDP growth rates and low inflation levels as the natural interest 
rate had diminished to low levels already decades earlier. However, the state of the 
real economy was not in line with the overheating financial markets. 
In the United States, mortgages were granted under the premise that background 
checks are unnecessary as house prices could only increase, and thus a borrower could 
always refinance a loan by using the increased value of the house as a collateral 
(Brunnermeier, 2009). Banks did not resist this behavior – new mortgages were 
announced as through collateralization and securitization, banks were able to sell 
mortgages off from their balance sheets and by doing so, shift the associated risks to 
the buyer, most commonly to an investment bank. The securitization process extended 
beyond the mortgage market loans and included corporate and consumer loans as well. 
Adrian and Shin (2010) point out that by the end of the second quarter of 2007, the 
assets held by institutions that fund themselves through issuing securities, were larger 
in value than the combined total assets that credit unions, saving institutions and 
commercial banks held in their balance sheets.  
The process of securitization offered many advantages to banks and other financial 
institutions. However, the complexity of these products went too far which encouraged 
market players to indulge in risky behavior. As the risk was decentralized to numerous 
market participants, eventually the whole financial system suffered from the 
consequences. The major financial innovation of the 20th century was eventually the 
main accelerator which helped to burst the U.S. housing bubble in 2007 and 
simultaneously revealed many weaknesses of the financial system itself (Makrevska, 
2013). The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis caused severe repercussions as large 
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financial institutions and investment banks that were involved in the housing markets, 
faced serious liquidity problems and substantial credit losses. 
2.3 Credit crisis and bankruptcies of large financial companies  
Securitization of assets expanded credit but led to a decline in credit quality. The 
financial architecture had undergone a significant transformation prior to the financial 
crisis of 2008. Whereas loans and mortgages are traditionally kept in a bank’s books, 
the rising popularity of securitization spurred banks to transfer the credit risk of 
different underlying assets to other financial institutions. As interbank lending is 
unsecured, the substantial increase in credit risk derived from rising counterparty risk 
due to the uncertainty of the banking sector’s exposure to troubled assets. Furthermore, 
the banking sector was financing its asset holdings with instruments of short maturity 
which left banks particularly exposed to a dry-up in funding liquidity.  
According to Brunnermeier (2009) the first big U.S. corporation to struggle was 
investment bank Bear Stearns. In March 2008 Bear Stearns faced worsening conditions 
in the financial markets as Carlyle Capital, an Amsterdam-listed hedge fund, got into 
trouble as its debt fund, Carlyle Capital Corp, collapsed and the Blue Wave – hedge 
fund liquidated. As Bear Stearns was a creditor of Carlyle Capital, illicit rumors of 
Bear Stearns being in a bad financial state started to spread on the market. Bear Stearns 
stock price collapsed from $159 to just $2 in a year. Eventually JPMorgan Chase, the 
biggest bank in the United States, acquired Bear Stearns for $236 million, or $2 per 
share. 
The omens of bad regulation and lack of transparency started to show on the market. 
The fate of Lehman Brothers, a former large investment bank, is often considered to 
be the main individual incident that expanded the credit crisis to a worldwide financial 
crisis in 2008. Lehman Brothers was operating with an extremely high level of 
leverage (asset-to-equity ratio) and relied heavily on short-term debt financing. While 
commercial banks are regulated and cannot leverage their equity more than 15 to 1, at 
the beginning of the credit crisis Lehman had a leverage of more than 30 to 1, in other 
words only $3.30 of equity for $100 of debt. With such high leverage, a mere 3.3% 
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decline in the asset value wipes out the entire value of equity and thus makes the 
company insolvent. (Zingales, 2008.) 
Lehman Brothers was accused of having sold Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) 
to its clients while simultaneously taking short positions in these securities which 
eroded the value of CDOs effectively. Goldman Sachs, one of the most powerful 
investment banks in the world, helped its clients (such as Lehman Brothers), to short 
the mortgage bond market, and by doing so, helped to pull the trigger of the subprime 
market. With record high debt-to-equity ratio and reliance on short-term debt 
financing, Lehman Brothers faced insurmountable liquidity shortage in the financial 
market that was ravaged by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. However, Lehman 
Brothers was not the sole respondent from the massive market altering and speculation 
as collusion between banks was obvious. This, in turn, indicates that market 
surveillance and monitoring had failed big time. The rising popularity of questionable 
banking activities such as securitizations and off-balance sheet trading exposed serious 
weaknesses in bank regulation. 
The failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008 was the largest case of bankruptcy in U.S. 
history. As Lehman Brothers announced its bankruptcy in 15th of September 2008, 
negative effects rippled through the market and the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
stock market index that measures the stock performance of 30 large companies listed 
on stock exchanges throughout the United States, declined by more than 500 points, 
or 4.4%, by the end of the trading day (Mamun & Johnson, 2012). The effects of the 
bankruptcy did not limit to the U.S. markets alone but were quickly spread to the whole 
global economy, expanding the credit crisis from U.S. markets to the global financial 
markets. 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the near failure of other major financial 
institutions in the autumn of 2008 froze key credit markets and collapsed aggregate 
demand (Klyuev et al., 2009). In a stagnant credit environment commercial banks 
tightened their credit standards considerably as the transmission mechanism between 
central banks’ policy rates and real economy and private borrowing rates suffered 
severe disruptions. Markets were not responding to policy rate announcements as 
expected and nonbank lending became virtually to a halt as banks increased their 
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margins and collateral requirements in an attempt to avoid any further losses from the 
situation. The actuation for the global financial crisis of 2008 was the mortgage crisis 
of the U.S. housing markets which finally culminated in the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers on September 15th, 2008. With the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the 
delusion that large interconnected financial corporations were ‘too big to fail’ broke, 
which drove the financial markets into despair.  
2.4 European sovereign debt crisis 
Fawley and Neely (2013) find that the financial crisis of 2008, the European sovereign 
debt crisis and the subsequent banking problems in Europe are intimately linked. 
Furthermore, there is a prevalent agreement amongst economists that the fundamental 
cause of the European sovereign debt crisis was the combination of the burst of the 
U.S. housing bubble and the credit boom which followed soon after. The European 
sovereign debt crisis started at the end of 2009, when the Greek sovereign, with an 
aggravating history of elevated government debt and deficits, started to lose credibility 
in financial markets. Greece revealed that its previous government had reported false 
information about the financial state of Greece, and that the real budget deficit of 
Greece was significantly higher than what was reported. As a result, Greek borrowing 
costs rose rapidly: in the end of April 2010, Greek ten-year bond yields moved above 
8%. Greek’s actions led to market panic spurring fears of a euro collapse via financial 
and political contagion.  
The crisis in Europe mutated from a banking crisis into a sovereign debt crisis 
threatening the credibility of the world’s second most important reserve currency, the 
euro (Overbeek, 2012). In the financial turmoil of the credit crisis, nearly all European 
governments launched sizeable stimulus programs between 2009 and 2010 to 
counteract the deficit of credit on global financial markets. The heterogenic euro area 
was facing supranational problems originating from the bleak state of the global world 
economy. These problems included stagnating export markets which was due to the 
loss of competitiveness in the international markets. By 2010, general government 
gross debt stood at 85% of GDP for the euro area as whole, which was considerably 
higher than what was agreed with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) agreement 
between the member states of the European Union in 1997. The aim of the SGP 
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agreement was to facilitate and maintain the stability of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), and it states that Member States should not have gross debt of over 
60% of their GDP. 
 
Figure 1. Gross debt (% of GDP) of chosen countries. 
Figure 1 above presents the gross debt as a percentage of GDP of chosen countries 
from the end of 2008 to the end of 2020. The year-end data is retrieved from the IMF 
Public Debt Database. The debt/GDP ratios climbed as the financial crisis broke out. 
When the crisis broke out, the growth of the debt/GDP ratio was more rapid in the 
United States, than it was within strong members of EMU, such as Germany or 
Netherlands. However, the already high debt/GDP ratios of financially erratic euro 
members, such as Greece, ran out of control. Despite the high gross debt percentages, 
the heavy debt burden on financially more stable euro countries was not so problematic 
under a low interest rate environment. The European sovereign debt crisis arose from 
the countries with diminished credit ratings and most severe structural economic 
problems. The inequality between the members of the EMU was palpable: With 
differing credit ratings, the most problematic euro members Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland, were charged 4-8 percent higher interest rates, than Germany, which borrowed 
at 2-2.5% rate from the market. 
Overbeek (2012) points out that large financial institutions played a key role in the 
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government to hide part of its debt so that Greece matched the qualifications to be a 
member of EMU, and thus gained membership in the common currency at the 
beginning of 2001. Even though Greece is often considered to be the main culprit in 
the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis, a number of other euro countries 
also struggle with harsh economic and financial problems. Right now, Italy is a much 
bigger problem for the EMU, than Greece, as it is a much larger and financially 
networked economy. Arguably, the EMU has structural flaws that have accentuated in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. European Central Bank has responded to 
these challenges by keeping the key interest rates down and by launching extensive 
unconventional asset purchase programmes. 
2.5 Ramifications from the financial crisis 
The financial crisis of 2008 resulted in significant increase in debt levels across 
advanced economies: Gross debt across advanced economies stood at 105% of GDP 
as of beginning of 2020 (prior the Covid-19 pandemic) compared to 72% in 2007 (IMF 
Public Debt Database). Furthermore, while the banking sector in the U.S. has written 
off non-performing loans, the banking sector of the euro area is still retaining pre-2008 
non-performing loans on their books to some extent. This number is especially high in 
Italy, as the World Bank estimates that 17% of the loans of Italy’s banking sector are 
still non-performing loans. 
The combination of loose monetary policy (i.e., low interest rates) and fiscal austerity 
that was adopted as a response to the financial crisis may have prevented the world 
economy from further financial meltdown, but it has also changed the architecture of 
economic policymaking profoundly. Central banks’ balance sheets have reached 
unparalleled levels as central banks have interfered in regulating the financial system 
in addition to managing monetary policy. New tools of central banking, such as the 
Quantitative Easing, have artificially inflated the prices of many financial assets. By 
directly intervening in financial markets, central banks have lowered the expected 
return on targeted safe assets (securities) with their balance sheet policies and thus 
pushed yield seeking investors to other asset classes with a higher expected return. 
Majority of investors have turned to stock markets, as it has been the only option to 
make a return. As a result, the stock market valuation levels worldwide have risen to 
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record highs. The post-financial crisis development of the European and the U.S. stock 
markets is further explained in chapter 5.1.1. 
In 2020 the global pandemic Covid-19 spread through the globe. Even though the 
pandemic was not a financial crisis, it practically halted the world economy. Central 
banks reacted with the same tools that they had adopted in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis. However, this time the liquidity injections to markets were greater than ever. In 
addition to that, the government indebtedness burst last year as the gross debt across 
advanced economies rose from 105% of GDP to 125% of GDP (see Figure 1). Now 
that it seems that the most acute phase of the Covid-19 crisis is behind us, the IMF 
predicts that the gross debt of advanced economies will remain more or less unchanged 
during the next five years. 
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3 MONETARY POLICY OF CENTRAL BANKS 
This chapter deals with the monetary policy of central banks in general. First, the role 
of the central banks in the monetary system is explained after which the tools of 
monetary policy – conventional and unconventional – are described. The post financial 
crisis monetary decisions of the ECB and the Fed are compared in order to form a more 
comprehensive introduction of central banks’ tools. After this chapter the reader 
should better understand the importance of central banks in terms of the functionality 
of the global financial markets. 
3.1 The role of the central banks 
Central banks are institutions that are authorized by governments to be the main 
respondents of monetary policy. This authorization underlines the importance of the 
role that central banks bear on financial markets. The effect of the monetary policy to 
the economy and to financial markets is based on the fact that central banks have the 
exclusive right to form the monetary base of the economy. This means that the central 
bank offers central bank funding to banks, issues notes and bonds to the public and 
furthermore, controls the money supply. With the given monopolistic mandate from 
the government, the central bank influences market conditions and controls short-term 
interest rates.  
Bordes and Clerc (2010) state that while central banks have their own stated missions 
and duties, they also have two primary objectives in common: price stability and 
financial stability. Inflation is thus monetary phenomenon and long-term rapid 
inflation is often associated with the growth of money supply. Changes in the overall 
demand, technological development or price shocks of raw materials can also affect 
short-term inflation and central banks can mitigate this effect by altering the money 
supply which, in practice, means a change in interest rates. (Mishkin et al., 2013.) Price 
stability is essential, as the overall rise of price level increases the market uncertainty 
which might disturb the economic growth. Financial stability can be strengthened by 
pursuing credible monetary policy which decreases the risk premium of real interest 
rates. Reducing risk premium enhances the diversion of money to capital markets 
which improves the general investment environment and encourages investors.  
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Central banks have a role as a lender of last resort. This means that they provide 
reserves and liquidity to a bank, financial institution or in rare cases to other too-big-
to-fail-institution experiencing serious and urgent financial problems. Casu et al. 
(2006, p. 125) argue that central banks’ role as a lender of last resort has a tendency to 
increase the moral hazard and risky behaviour in the banking sector. However, it is 
naive to assume that the central bank could guarantee the solvency of every banking 
institution in its country. 
Prior to the global financial crisis of 2008, the aim of monetary policy worldwide was 
to achieve low and stable inflation. Central banks’ main instrument in achieving and 
securing the inflation targets was the short-term interest rate at which the central banks 
provided funding to banks. Conventional monetary policy amongst the mature 
economies was predictable, effective and largely successful pursuit of low inflation. 
However, while conventional monetary policy achieved its goals of low and stable 
inflation, it did not prevent market bubbles from occurring. (Joyce, et al. 2012.) The 
structural flaws of the market economy grew so great that the market collapse of 2008 
was inevitable and no monetary policy tool, whether conventional or unconventional, 
could have prevented the crisis. After the crisis, central banks have been forced to 
focus on the financial stability of the markets in addition to ensuring that inflation 
meets the targets set. In recent years, the central banks have used unconventional 
monetary policy tools to a growing extent to ensure the financial stability of the 
market. The tools of monetary policy – conventional and unconventional, are 
presented next. 
3.2 Tools of conventional monetary policy 
Central banks use monetary policy tools to alter the money supply and interest rates. 
The most important conventional tools of modern monetary policy are open market 
operations, reserve requirements and key interest rates.  Although this thesis processes 
the conventional monetary policy of the ECB and the Fed mainly through interest rate 
policy, other means of conventional monetary policy tools are briefly introduced as 
well, as they are often set up simultaneously to improve the effectiveness of monetary 
policy (CFA Institute, 2017). Furthermore, the difference between conventional asset 
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purchases through open market operations and unconventional asset purchases through 
quantitative or credit easing is clarified.   
3.2.1 Key interest rates 
This thesis considers the guiding of key interest rates to be the most important 
conventional monetary policy tool of the central banks. Central banks set the key 
interest rates in order to guide the main monetary variables in the economy. Such 
variables include consumer prices (inflation), credit expansion and market interest 
rates. Under normal times, lowering the key interest rate eases the market conditions 
and stimulates the economy whereas raising the key interest rate tightens the market 
conditions and is used to prevent overheating of the economy. 
Governing Council, the main decision-making body of the ECB, sets the three key 
interest rates of the euro area, that are; 1) the interest rate on the main refinancing 
operations (ECB Refinancing Rate), which normally provides the majority of the 
liquidity to the banking system; 2) the rate on the marginal lending facility, which 
offers overnight credit to banks included in the Euro system and 3) the rate of deposit 
facility, which banks of the Euro system use to make overnight deposits. In this thesis, 
the ECB Refinancing Rate is chosen to present the interest rate policy on the euro area 
as a whole, as it is considered to be the main key interest rate of the ECB. ECB 
Refinancing Rate guides the market interest rates of the euro area and is the rate on 
which banks of the Euro system can borrow directly from the ECB. 
Federal Open Market Committee, the monetary policy-making body of the Fed, sets 
the key interest rate of the U.S. economy - the Federal Funds Target Rate. The Federal 
Funds Target Rate is the rate on which the U.S. commercial banks borrow and lend 
their excess reserves to each other overnight. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) find that 
the Federal Funds Target Rate sensitively records shocks to the supply of bank reserves 
thus making the Federal Funds Target Rate a good indicator of monetary policy actions 




Figure 2. ECB Refinancing Rate and Federal Funds Target Rate between 01/2008-12/2020. 
The ECB started to cut its primary policy rate, the ECB Refinancing Rate, from 4.25 
percent in October 2008 and hit its subsequent lower bound in May 2009, when the 
ECB Refinancing Rate was set to 1 percent (Fawley & Neely, 2013). However, 
afterwards the ECB cut the ECB Refinancing Rate even more and set this primary 
policy rate to zero in March 2016, where it has stayed ever since.  
As the global economy sank into recession in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the 
Fed decreased its primary policy rate swiftly: The Federal Funds Target Rate was 
decreased from 4.25 percent to 0.25 percent during 2008. Wright (2012) argues that 
the Fed hit its zero-lower bound of interest rate at that specific range of 0-0.25 and 
could not lower the Federal Funds Target Rate anymore without it becoming a negative 
one. Going below zero-lower bound could have had unintended consequences in terms 
of inflation, for example. 
Greenlaw et al. (2018) argue that the most important and reliable tool of Fed’s 
monetary policy is the short-term interest rate, and thus see that by altering the Federal 
Funds Target Rate the Fed is able to better guide the economic activity of the U.S., 
than by conducting large-scale asset purchase programmes. As the economic stance of 
the U.S. stabilized, and the market was already starting to show signs from 
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However, the Covid-19 pandemic forced the Fed to decrease the Federal Funds Target 
Rate once again to its zero-lower bound of 0-0.25 in order to provide monetary 
stimulus to the economy and enhance the effectiveness of asset purchases.  
Whereas the U.S. operates in a consolidated union, the euro area comprises of 19 
sovereign governments with separate national budget constraints. Thus, the internal 
threat of losing market confidence is way greater for the ECB than it is for the Fed, 
and due to this, the monetary policy decisions and acts of the ECB often seem sluggish 
when compared to the ones of the Fed. For this reason, raising the key interest rate is 
not as troublesome for the ECB as it is for the Fed. It can be argued that, as the 
economies are recovering from Covid-19, the Fed will start to raise the Federal Funds 
Target Rate sooner than the ECB is able to raise the ECB Refinancing Rate. 
3.2.2 Open market operations 
Open market operation is the most commonly used indirect monetary policy 
instrument in developed countries (Casu et al., 2006, p. 119). In an open market 
operation, the central bank either sells or purchases debt securities to the non-bank 
private sector. By selling debt securities to the market, the central bank absorbs money 
from the market resulting in interest rate increase and money supply decrease. The 
effects are contrary, if the central bank decides to purchase debt securities, which is 
like an injection of money to the markets - money supply increases and interest rates 
decrease. Casu et al. (2006, p. 119) argue that open market operations attract central 
banks as they can be easily reversed (by opposite open market operation) and can be 
undertaken rather quickly. Thus, open market operations are flexible and precise and 
usable for minor or major changes. 
In traditional open market operation, the central bank lends money to the financial 
institutions on the secondary market and, in exchange, receives securities as collateral. 
Afterwards, the central bank conducts an inverse action where these received 
collaterals are resold and the loan received by the financial institution is repaid with 
interest. This inverse situation is called sterilization operation, which has a direct 
inverse reaction that neutralizes the effect of the open market operation to the monetary 
market. The difference to unconventional asset purchases is clear: In Quantitative 
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Easing (QE) no sterilization operations are made and thus, the balance sheet of a 
central bank is heavily affected as result, whereas in Credit Easing (CE) the central 
bank does not sell the received collaterals back to the market but keeps them in the 
balance sheet. Both QE and CE are explained in more detail in their own individual 
chapters. 
3.2.3 Discount windows and standing facilities 
Contrary to open market operations initiated by central banks, discount windows and 
standing facilities are launched by credit institutions. These monetary tools allow 
central banks’ counterparts to regulate their overnight liquidity with their own 
initiative. When credit institutions borrow from central banks, the borrowing has a cost 
which is equal to an existing discount rate and by altering that discount rate, the central 
bank can influence the demand for the short-term money and thus is able to guide the 
short-term money supply and short-term market interest rates in the economy. 
Standing facilities refers to a monetary tool of the ECB whereas discount windows are 
used by the Fed. 
The ECB uses standing facilities with an aim to control overnight liquidity and to 
signal the general monetary policy stance. Two different standing facilities are in use: 
Marginal lending facility, which allows the counterparts to obtain overnight liquidity 
from the National Central Banks (NCBs), and deposit facility, which allows the 
counterparts to make overnight deposits with the NCBs. The ECB states that normally 
the interest rate for the deposit facility provides a floor for the overnight market interest 
rate. 
The Fed offers three discount window programmes to credit institutions, which all 
have their own interest rates. These discount windows are primary credit, secondary 
credit and seasonal credit from which the primary credit is the Fed’s main discount 
window programme. Under the primary credit programme, loans to credit institutions 
are extended for a very short time (usually overnight) and thus are offered only to 
counterparts that meet sound financial conditions. Counterparts that are not eligible to 
receive primary credit, may receive secondary credit to meet their short-term liquidity 
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needs.  Seasonal credit is extended only to relatively small credit institutions that have, 
for example, cyclical funding needs. 
3.2.4 Reserve requirements 
Central banks impose minimum reserve requirements to credit institutions, such as 
commercial banks. The required reserve should be calculated according to liabilities 
in the balance sheet of the credit institution and should then be held at the central bank 
(Gray, 2011). With reserve requirements, the central bank can stabilize market interest 
rates by giving credit institutions an inducement to smooth the effects of short-term 
liquidity fluctuations as part of their deposits are bound to the central bank. 
The importance of reserve requirements as a monetary tool is diminished as central 
banks have recently favored open market operations, discount windows and standing 
facilities over reserve requirements (Casu et al., 2006, p. 122). Above mentioned 
monetary tools are more flexible than reserve requirements, as it is difficult to make 
small adjustments to the money supply via reserve requirements. As such, the role of 
reserve requirements in modern monetary policy is to be an instrument that reduces 
the risk taking of credit institutions and improves their solvency, rather than to be an 
actual monetary policy tool that the central banks alter and use actively. 
3.3 Tools of unconventional monetary policy 
Central banks were forced to turn to unconventional monetary policy measures in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, as, resulting from the rapid interest rate cuts, both the 
ECB and the Fed faced the zero-lower bound of policy rates under which it was not 
possible to ease the market conditions with policy rate cuts anymore. The zero-lower 
bound is a macroeconomic problem that occurs when the central bank cuts it’s 
guidance rate so drastically that the short-term nominal interest rate drops to zero or 
near to zero. This causes a liquidity trap which further limits the capacity of the central 
bank to stimulate economic growth through interest rate policy. At that level, any 
additional monetary stimulus is called unconventional. Furthermore, the tools of 
conventional monetary policy are rather inefficient once the zero-lower bound has 
been reached (see for example Kontonikas et al., 2013). 
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During market instability and market crises, implementing monetary policy is a more 
complex process than it is under normal market conditions. Resulting from the increase 
in the counterparty risk, the demand for reserves of credit institutions in financial 
markets rises. This causes pressure to money market rates which increases the 
challenges that central banks face in controlling them. Furthermore, the transmission 
channels of monetary policy are disrupted as a consequence of soaring financial 
tension and thus, the monetary policy impulse cannot be transmitted to the financial 
assets effectively. Proportional to the size of the economic shock and its effects on the 
real economy, curtailing policy rate to stimulate demand could not be adequate as the 
policy rate hits the zero-lower bound (Cecioni et al., 2011). Under the abnormal 
economic conditions resulting from the global financial crisis, central banks pursue an 
unconventional monetary policy to address the distortions in monetary transmission 
mechanism with a goal to revive the real economy. 
Central banks use various measures that can be described to be unconventional – 
deriving from normal.  These unconventional measures are used to lessen financial 
market tension and to stimulate real economic activity under low interest rate 
environment. Peersmann (2014) classifies unconventional measures into two broad 
categories: Forward guidance policies and balance sheet policies. The first of these 
two broad categories, forward guidance policies, relies heavily on using 
communication tools through which the central banks aim to shape the economic 
agents’ expectations about the likely future path of monetary policy. The second broad 
category of central banks’ unconventional measures, balance sheet policies, gathers a 
set of means that reflect from central banks’ balance sheet to the underlying market 
conditions. These methods include providing liquidity to financial markets and 
purchasing private or public assets. Balance sheet policies can be further divided to 
Quantitative Easing and Credit Easing. 
In this thesis, the unconventional monetary policy is classified as an additional 
stimulus by the central bank when the nominal interest rate has been already brought 
down. As such, three different tools of unconventional monetary policy are 
recognized: 1) Signaling and forward guidance – guiding medium to long-term interest 
rate expectations, 2) Quantitative Easing – expanding the size of the central bank’s 
balance sheet and 3) Credit Easing – changing the composition of the central bank’s 
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balance sheet. Next, these unconventional tools are further explained in their 
individual chapters. 
3.3.1 Signaling and forward guidance 
Eggertson and Woodford (2003) state that although central banks steer short-term 
interest rates, the monetary policy stance is more related with long-term interest rates. 
The market reckons long-term interest rates in borrowing and investment decisions. 
Yilmaz (2015) argues that long-term interest rates – having a pivotal role in monetary 
transmission mechanism – are determined according to the expectations of market 
participants on short-term interest rates as the expectations theory predicts. According 
to the expectations theory of the yield curve, interest rates on long-term bonds are a 
weighted average of current and expected short-term interest rates over the long-term 
bond and thus, an investor earns the same interest by investing in two consecutive one-
year bond investments versus investing in one two-year bond today. Central banks 
affect long-term interest rates by announcing intentions about future policy rates and 
by altering expectations of short-term rates accordingly. If a central bank wants to 
influence financial markets by using forward guidance, the conducted policy should 
be intact even after the economic recovery supposedly strengthens. Credibility plays 
an important role in guidance policies – market participants should be convinced that 
the central bank will not renege on its commitment but continues to conduct monetary 
policy as previously informed. Otherwise, a time-inconsistency problem would 
emerge, and the announcements would not be reflected in market expectations and 
asset prices (Yilmaz, 2015). With forward guidance policies central banks encourage 
investors to shift their portfolios into long-term maturities and aim to lessen the market 
volatility by expressing intentions at times of distress (Issing, 2014). 
Since July 2013, the ECB has provided forward guidance about its expectations for 
future policy rates to anchor medium-term rates at levels that are more consistent with 
the policy intentions of the ECB (Altavilla et al., 2015). The first time that the Fed 
used forward guidance to effectively alter the market environment was on 9th of August 
2011, when the Fed announced that the Federal Funds Target Rate will be kept low 
considerably longer than what the market was expecting. The Fed indeed stuck to this 
announcement as seen from Figure 2. Peersman (2014) reminds that forward guidance 
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policies can only influence expectations, and hence longer-term interest rates and asset 
prices, to the extent in which they are still credible in the eyes of market participants. 
3.3.2 Quantitative Easing (QE)  
Asset purchases form a crucial part of central banks’ balance sheet policies. By 
purchasing assets, the central bank aims to increase the bank reserves of the economy 
(Yilmaz, 2015). Under normal market conditions an increase in bank reserves is a by-
product of asset purchases as the main focus lies in the price of these reserves. 
However, during abnormal market conditions such as crises, the aim of asset purchases 
is to affect the quantity of bank reserves and, due to this, this policy is foremost referred 
to as “Quantitative Easing” (QE). Joyce et al. (2012) find that as central banks are 
rising reserves, banks will expand credits to the whole economy which stimulates 
aggregate demand accordingly. QE has been the most high-profile form of 
unconventional monetary policy after the financial crisis. Friedman (2013) argues that 
unconventional monetary programs, such as QE, can be used as a substitute to 
conventional interest-rate policy. As QE is practiced in a different scale, it is often 
distinguished from open market operations by referring to QE as large-scale asset 
purchases. 
According to Lenza et al. (2010) central banks are using QE when they increase their 
balance sheets by acquiring more “conventional assets” such as government bonds 
from the market. To implement an effective policy, QE does not include any 
sterilization operations, which distinguishes QE from conventional monetary policy of 
open market operation as well as from Credit Easing.  When no sterilization operations 
are conducted, the size of the balance sheet of the central bank is increased, but the 
composition is not. In other words, the portfolio of assets held by the central bank is 
not altered. 
As the central bank withdraws the purchased assets from the secondary markets, it 
neutralizes a part of the supply of financial assets. The yield of these withdrawn assets 
decreases, which transfers a part of asset demand to more risky assets. Therefore, the 
process of QE stimulates consumption and investments by altering the allocation of 
liquidity on financial markets. QE is most effective when the zero-lower bound of 
29 
interest rate is achieved, as under such circumstances the central bank does not pay 
any interest on its reserves (Bini Smaghi, 2009). To summarize: QE is an attempt to 
boost economic activity via expansion of the money supply.    
3.3.3 Credit Easing (CE) 
Credit Easing (CE) consists of purchases of securities by central banks either from 
commercial banks or directly from the securities market. The purpose of CE is to back 
the liquidity and the price of chosen securities. CE provides liquidity to certain market 
segments that are in distress through purchases of various asset classes such as 
commercial paper, corporate bonds and asset-backed securities. When central banks 
acquire these above-mentioned assets from the private sector, the risk profile of their 
balance sheet is affected. As such, CE shifts central banks’ assets to riskier and less 
liquid assets, while holding the size of the balance sheet unchanged. The size of the 
balance sheet remains constant thanks to the simultaneous sterilization operations. 
(Framer, 2012.) The main difference between QE and CE is that in QE, the size of the 
central bank’s balance sheet increases but the composition of the balance sheet remains 
constant, while in CE the size of the balance sheet remains constant but the 
composition changes. Furthermore, the first post-financial crisis large-scale asset 
purchase programmes of ECB were CE programmes as they are not seen as radical as 
QE programmes. 
With CE the central banks improve liquidity in key market segments of private debt 
securities which reduces market interest rates further. Beirne et al. (2011) underline 
that CE facilitates financing conditions for firms and financial institutions as 
commercial banks expand their lending to the private sector. However, CE increases 
the credit risk of central banks, as they include riskier assets to their balance sheets.  
Introduced balance sheet policies, QE and CE, can also be mixed. For example, the 
QE programmes of ECB include, in addition to traditional low-risk government bonds, 
asset purchases of more riskier asset classes such as corporate bonds and asset-backed 
securities. Easing with these asset classes is often perceived as typical easing for CE 
operations. As unconventional balance sheet policies impact the quality and the size 
of the central bank’s balance sheet, they are clearly distinguished from conventional 
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asset purchase tools such as open market operations. Although unconventional asset 
purchases may increase the overall credit risk on the market, they appear to be 
necessary to redress the financial markets in situations, where conventional monetary 
means are not enough.  
3.3.4 Consequences from the balance sheet policies 
Central bank balance sheets have changed continuously, in many cases as a passive 
response to monetary policy actions such as open market operations (Chen et al., 
2012). However, the size and composition of the balance sheet does not vary that much 
under open market operations. Now it seems that large-scale asset purchase 
programmes have replaced interest rates as the main policy instrument of central banks 
(Beck et al., 2019). Due to the large-scale asset purchase programmes, the size and 
composition of the balance sheets of the ECB and the Fed have changed considerably 
over the decade. 
 
Figure 3. Total assets of ECB (€) and Fed ($) between 2017-2020. 
Figure 3 above presents the evolution of the ECB’s and the Fed’s balance sheets after 
the financial crisis in terms of total assets. Year-end situation of the ECB is retrieved 
from the annual reports of the ECB and year-end situation of the Fed is retrieved from 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Balance sheets are shown in 
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can easily distinguish the asset purchase programmes of the ECB and the Fed from 
Figure 3, as they have had a direct effect on the size of the balance sheets of these 
central banks. 
A direct implication of eased liquidity provision to the market was the increase in the 
size of the ECB balance sheet: Between 2007 and mid-2012, the size of the ECB’s 
balance sheet more than doubled (Constâncio, 2018). Between 2012 and early 2015 
the ECB eased monetary conditions through interest rate cuts (see Figure 2) and was 
able to reduce the size of the balance sheet.  However, in 2015 the ECB launched its 
first QE programme consisting of multiple different programmes under which monthly 
large-scale asset purchases have been made. These purchases have resulted in an 
upward trend in the size of the ECB’s balance sheet.  
During the financial crisis and subsequent recession, Fed’s total assets increased 
significantly from $0.9 trillion in the beginning of 2008 to $4.5 trillion in early 2015. 
Fed’s total assets remained relatively constant between 2015 and 2017 until it started 
the Federal Open Market Committee’s balance sheet normalization programme, which 
took place between October 2017 and August 2019. Under the normalization 
programme, the Fed decreased its total assets to under $3.8 trillion. In September 2019, 
the total assets held by the Fed started to increase again.  
The Covid-19 pandemic required large responses from all of the major central banks. 
When the asset prices are in a downward spiral, large-scale asset purchases are highly 
effective and especially when the interest rates are pressed down (see Figure 2). By 
conducting large-scale asset purchases, the ECB and Fed were able to reverse the 
downward spiral and provided confidence to stock markets (see Figure 5 and Figure 
6). As a result, the total assets that the ECB and the Fed hold in their balance sheets 
have skyrocketed (see Figure 3). 
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4 MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM 
Monetary policy decisions affect the economy through a so-called monetary 
transmission mechanism. The transmission mechanism is a complicated and 
networked entity, which forms from the economic dependencies of different variables. 
Ireland (2005) describes monetary transmission mechanism as the effect of a change 
in nominal money stock or nominal short-term interest rates on real variables such as 
aggregate output and employment. The monetary transmission mechanism of a 
standard interest-rate policy is based on a group of theories that are relatively 
consistent, but the monetary transmission mechanism of unconventional policies is not 
so well known, nor studied. Today, understanding the monetary transmission 
mechanism is perhaps more important than ever, as central banks have adopted the use 
of unconventional monetary policy tools while, simultaneously, more traditional tools 
have been restricted by the zero bound of interest rate. 
At the wake of the financial crisis the monetary transmission mechanism suffered 
heavy distortions and as a result, market participants reacted weakly to monetary 
impulses sent through traditional interest-rate policies. Wright (2012) describes that 
distortions in the monetary transmission mechanism were caused by the impending 
zero-lower bound, which caused the inability to cut main interest rates any further, 
even though the natural interest rate was already negative. Furthermore, there was a 
sharp increase in demand for reserves in the financial system which limited the 
redistribution of liquidity between financial institutions and reduced the capability of 
central banks to control market interest rates further. Distortions in the transmission 
mechanism under abnormal market conditions are visible when market participants 
see interest rate cut, that under normal market conditions eases the market conditions, 
as a sign from worsening economic conditions which results in a negative market 
reaction.  As the monetary transmission channel of traditional monetary policy tools 
was not working, central banks were forced to take more unconventional methods 
under consideration. The implementation of unconventional monetary policy tools by 
the leading central banks at the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 has been the most 
significant shift in the practice of central banking during recent years. Unconventional 
monetary policy transmission mechanisms include three broad channels: The signaling 
channel, the portfolio balance channel and the liquidity channel. (Janus, 2016.) 
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The effectiveness of transmission of the monetary stimulus through signaling channel 
relies heavily on the credibility of a central bank. Taking the assumption of financial 
markets efficiency under consideration, we can distinguish the so-called 
announcement effect, that captures the direct impact of new information releases from 
central bank’s use of unconventional monetary policy tools to the market. Bauer and 
Rudebusch (2013) argue that signaling channel includes stimulation of inflationary 
expectations, fall of the real interest rates, changes in the term structure of market 
interest rates and increase in investments and the overall demand. Large-scale asset 
purchases send a signal that the short-term interest rates are most likely to remain low 
and such an expectation will also lower long-term rates. Furthermore, this signal 
supports the stock market price development. 
The portfolio balance channel is based on theories of imperfect substitutability of 
assets. Therefore, the central bank can impact on market participants decisions by 
altering the value and composition of its assets. Bowdler and Radia (2012) find that 
the central bank’s market availability diminishes when it starts to buy a chosen asset 
class due to the so-called local supply effect. When a central bank executes 
transactions in financial markets, such as the purchasing of government debt, it raises 
the demand for sovereign debt which increases the price of existing bonds while 
lowering the interest paid (Falagiarda & Reitz, 2015). Simultaneously, market 
participants rebalance their portfolios within the segment that the central bank just 
altered with its asset purchases. Profit seeking investors shift to more riskier assets in 
order to receive higher returns. Through portfolio balance channel, large-scale asset 
purchase programmes have encouraged private sector individuals to allocate their 
capital especially to the stock markets. 
According to the liquidity channel of unconventional monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, the use and effects of central banks’ unconventional tools should be 
viewed through the increase in central banks’ liabilities and reserve supply. Thus, 
unconventional policies are closely bound to the improvement of financial institutions’ 
balances which increases the overall availability of external financing to market 
participants. Monetarists often argue that the importance of the liquidity channel 
derives from the fundamental differences between the monetary base, which is 
controlled by central banks, and other market assets. Therefore, as the effects of 
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unconventional monetary policies are dependent on the shifts in central bank’s 
liabilities, an increase in monetary base should cause changes in broader monetary 
aggregates even under the current zero-lower bound of the euro area (Janus, 2016). 
Through the liquidity channel, banks increase the offering of commercial, industrial 
and real estate lending. This leads to positive liquidity shock, which also contributes 
favorably to the development of the stock markets. 
Mishkin et al. (2013) argue that the effectiveness of the monetary transmission 
mechanism might be different in different economies as the transmission mechanism 
is dependent on variables such as the level of openness, degree of financial debt and 
possible frictions of the economy. As such, the monetary transmission mechanism 
should be more efficient in advanced economies than in emerging economies. 
Theoretical models of unconventional monetary policy transmission mechanism are 
not as sophisticated as models considering conventional monetary policy transmission 
mechanism are, and due to this, it is hard to fully explain the impact of changes in 
central banks’ balance sheets on financial markets. Reaching zero-lower bound of 
interest rate has limited the options of conventional monetary easing such as interest 
rate cuts, but the monetary transmission mechanism functions also in the zero-interest 
rate environment (Mishkin et al. 2013). 
4.1 Monetary policy and stock prices 
Stock prices are among the most closely monitored asset prices and are commonly 
regarded as being highly sensitive to economic conditions (Ioannidis & Kontonikas, 
2008). According to the discounted cash flow model, stock prices are equal to the 
present value of expected future net cash flows. Monetary policy should then play an 
important role in determining stock returns either by altering the discount rate used by 
market participants (e.g., by guiding key interest rates) or by influencing market 
participants’ expectations of future economic activity and conditions. 
Cassola and Morana (2002) find that liquidity preference shocks are the most 
important determinant of real stock market price index volatility in the short-term. 
Monetary easing through balance sheet policies aims to increase the liquidity available, 
and announcements of large-scale asset purchase programmes are a textbook example 
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of positive liquidity shocks. Cassola and Morana also find that permanent monetary 
surprises have a strong, yet temporary, impact on the stock market. Since the financial 
crisis, the monetary policy of ECB has headed to a direction where interest rates are 
kept around the zero-lower bound and monetary easing is provided through balance 
sheet policies. As the debt/GDP ratios of euro area countries have swollen and the 
economic growth stalled, it is not expected that the ECB will change the direction of 
its monetary policy in the near future. 
4.1.1 Market efficiency 
One of the key theoretical aspects related to studying the effect of large-scale asset 
purchase announcements on stock returns is the efficiency of the stock markets. 
According to Fama (1970), market efficiency causes current stock prices to always 
incorporate and reflect all relevant and available information. This fundamental 
concept is known as the efficient market hypothesis and event studies often rely on the 
semi-strong form of it. Fama (1970) divides market efficiency into three common 
forms. The weak form efficiency assumes that there are no patterns to stock prices and 
thus the stock prices must move randomly. Semi-strong form of market efficiency 
assumes that share prices reflect all publicly available information in an unbiased way 
and as such, should adjust quickly to reflect any new relevant information. Strong form 
of market efficiency assumes that in addition to any public information, stock prices 
reflect private information as well and according to it, no one, including insiders, can 
earn excess returns on the stock market. 
In terms of this thesis, the semi-strong form of market efficiency is considered, as the 
ECB’s asset purchase programme announcements represent public information. The 
aim is to determine, whether the release of new public information generates 
measurable and significant abnormal return on an index level, or not. If the semi-strong 
form of this hypothesis holds, the current stock prices are correct and all new 




Figure 4. Market efficiency in case of new information. 










Figure 4 above presents the predicted price change of a stock price, if a semi-strong 
form of efficient market hypothesis holds. Announcing new large-scale asset purchase 
programmes represent new positive information that should spread to the economy, 
including the stock markets. Leaning on this, we can assume the euro area stock price 
reaction of chosen events to be positive. If no significant intraday effect is detected, it 
would be a sign of market inefficiency. 
4.1.2 International integration of stock markets 
In addition to market efficiency, the international integration and co-movement of 
stock markets is a relevant issue for this study as the possible announcement effect of 
ECB’s asset purchase programmes is measured from the U.S. stock markets (S&P 500) 
as well. Chen (2018) reminds that increased economic globalization and international 
capital flows have accelerated financial market linkages across the countries in recent 
decades. As the financial integration goes deeper, the correlations between stock 
markets become stronger. A good example of deep financial integration is the financial 
crisis which started from the unhealthy U.S. housing markets and spread quickly to the 
world economy causing a worldwide market collapse. However, since the financial 
crisis the European and the U.S. stock markets diverged and followed very different 
recovery paths. Resulting from differing recovery paths, the performance of these 
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stock markets has differed a lot during the last decade. Reasons behind this are 
discussed further in chapter 5.1.1. 
There is a wide variety of theoretical and empirical studies on the international 
integration and co-movement of stock markets. For example, Ioannidis and 
Kontonikas (2008) investigate the impact of monetary policy on stock returns in 
thirteen OECD countries over the time period 1972-2002 and find that changes in 
monetary policy affect stock returns significantly. Their results remain largely 
unchanged, when the increasing co-movement among international stock markets is 
taken into account. Jiang et al. (2017) find that the correlation of stock markets 
between the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan and Hong Kong has enhanced 
notably after the financial crisis. Furthermore, previous studies have also indicated that 
especially the U.S. stock market presents co-movement relationships with other 
developed markets such as the European stock market. Assuming that the efficient 
market hypothesis holds and that co-movement among international stock markets 
exists, we can expect that the average stock market reaction of both European stock 




5 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Data collection and description 
The purpose of the event study conducted in this thesis is to measure the announcement 
effect of ECB’s asset purchase programmes on two separate indices: STOXX Europe 
600 and S&P 500. To achieve this goal, the daily closing prices of STOXX Europe 
600 and S&P 500 are obtained from Yahoo Finance throughout the whole sample 
period from January 1st of 2008 to December 31st of 2020. Following subchapter 5.1.1 
presents the chosen indices in more detail.  
From the beginning of 2008 to the end of 2020 nine different purchase programmes of 
ECB are identified and studied. Announcements are made by the Governing Council 
of ECB and are further explained in subchapter 5.1.2.  The announcements of the 
purchase programmes shatter across the sample period quite evenly, which increases 
the generalizability of the findings. Furthermore, the announcements include both QE 
programmes and CE programmes (see Table 2). 
5.1.1 STOXX Europe 600 and S&P 500 
This thesis uses STOXX Europe 600 index as a representation of the European stock 
markets and S&P 500 index as a representation of the U.S. stock markets. These 
indices are chosen as, arguably, the S&P 500 index is the leading large-cap index to 
represent stocks traded on the U.S. stock exchanges. Due to its broad market exposure, 
the STOXX Europe 600 index is often quoted as the European equivalent of the U.S. 
focused S&P 500 index. All in all, the chosen indices describe the stock market 




Figure 5. STOXX Europe 600 index between 01/2008 and 12/2020. 
 
Figure 6. S&P 500 index between 01/2008 and 12/2020. 
Figure 5 and 6 present the daily closing prices of STOXX Europe 600 and S&P 500 
during the given time-period. Since the financial crisis, the development of S&P 500 
has been much more straightforward than the one of STOXX Europe 600. As the price 
of S&P 500 has more than doubled from the beginning of 2008, the STOXX Europe 
600 only recently passed the price of the early 2008. To interpret this significant 
difference between the chosen indices, two major explanatory factors are 
distinguished. Firstly, structural problems overshadowed the European economy 
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financial crisis, Europe sank into the sovereign debt crisis. The clouds above the 
European economy and cooperation became even gloomier when the United Kingdom 
held a referendum considering the European Union membership. On 23rd of June 2016, 
the United Kingdom voted to withdraw from the European Union. 
Secondly, the past decade was a winning parade for the U.S tech stocks, during which 
the market value of such companies soared significantly. At the end of 2020, the top 
three weighted stocks of S&P 500 were 1) Apple Inc., with an index weight of 6.7% 
and market capitalization of $2.232 billion, 2) Microsoft Corp., with an index weight 
of 5.3% and market capitalization of $1.682 billion and 3) Amazon.com Inc., with an 
index weight of 4.4% and market capitalization of $1.634 billion. Concurrently, three 
top weighted stocks of STOXX Europe 600 were 1) Nestle SA, with and index weight 
of 3.1% and market capitalization of $339 billion, 2) Roche Holding AG, with and 
index weight of 2.3% and market capitalization of $300 billion and 3) Novartis AG, 
with an index weight of 2.1% and market capitalization of $215 billion. 
In early spring of 2020, the Covid-19 shock ravaged the stock market as the risk-
tolerant economic agents living in uncertainty offloaded the risky assets from their 
portfolios. In a matter of weeks, both STOXX Europe 600 and S&P 500 (and also 
other stock indices around the globe) plunged over 30%. Looking back, the U.S. stock 
market has recovered faster from the Covid-19 pandemic than Europe as the price of 
S&P 500 is already clearly above the pre-pandemic price level whereas STOXX 
Europe 600 has not yet reached the pre-pandemic price level (see Figure 5 and Figure 
6). One major reason for this is that the top weighted industries of S&P 500 (see for 
example top three weighted stocks mentioned above) remained relatively strong and 
were able to make a quick recovery when more traditional manufacturing industries 
that are represented in larger proportion in STOXX Europe 600 have understandably 
experienced the shock as more severe and prolonged. 
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5.1.2 ECB’s asset purchase programmes 
This subchapter presents the asset purchase programmes of ECB whose announcement 
effect on the chosen indices is later studied in the event study section of this thesis. 
The Governing Council is the main decision-making body of the ECB and is thus 
responsible for decisions relating to monetary objectives on the euro area. 
Furthermore, the Governing Council is the first party to present selected monetary 
policy guidelines to the public. When this thesis refers to decisions of the ECB, it is 
referring to decisions and statements made by the Governing Council.  
Considering international standards, the ECB was a late comer to the group of central 
banks engaged in unconventional monetary policy (Lombardi, et al., 2018). This is 
especially true with the Quantitative Easing (QE) programmes as the first QE 
programme was introduced as late as in the early 2015. For comparison, Fed 
introduced its’ first QE programme already on 25th of November 2008. In this respect, 
it is notable that the ECB started its QE programme in relatively calm times. Before 
the first QE announcement, the ECB was easing through CE programmes. 
First and Second Covered Bond Purchase Programmes (CBPP1 & CBPP2) 
According to Fawley and Neely (2013) the ECB’s major cuts to the ECB Refinancing 
Rate between 2008 and 2009 were not enough to calm the distressed markets, where 
concerns over counterparty risks still existed. As a result of market tension, by early 
2009 the interbank lending of the euro area had dried up. The ECB responded to this 
market failure with introducing its first asset purchase programme on 7th of May 2009, 
when the First Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP1) was introduced to the 
public. While other central banks (e.g., Fed and the Bank of England) were conducting 
QE through large-scale purchase of domestic government bonds, the ECB was 
determined to provide exceptional liquidity measures to banks through the purchase of 
other asset classes.    
ECB conducted the first purchases under the CBPP1 programme on 2nd of July 2009. 
According to its name, the CBPP1 programme targeted covered bonds, which are long-
term debt securities issued by credit institutions. Covered bonds are used to refinance 
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loans to the public and private sector and prior to the financial crisis of 2008, the 
markets for covered bonds in the euro area had grown strongly. Covered bonds have 
some clear advantages and specific legal characteristics of “double protection” as they 
are secured by a protected group of high-quality assets such as public sector debt or 
mortgage loans and, in addition to that, they grant their holder a privileged claim on 
the pool of cover assets upon possible default of the issuer. The bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, and the financial crisis of 2008 in more general, impaired the investors’ 
confidence and shaped investors’ preferences towards less risky asset classes such as 
government bonds. With an increase in risk avoidance, covered bonds became less 
attractive. To prevent the covered bond market from failing, the ECB implemented the 
CBPP1 programme with purchases of €60 billion in covered bonds. The programme 
was implemented gradually between July 2009 and June 2010 and eventually reached 
the intended nominal value of €60 billion in purchases.  
As the euro area did not recover from the sovereign debt crisis by 2011, the ECB 
decided to launch the Second Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP2). Details 
regarding CBPP2 were announced to the public on 3rd of October 2011. CBPP2 was 
slightly smaller than its predecessor CBPP1 and included purchases of covered bonds 
in both the primary and the secondary markets with a worth of €40 billion. However, 
by the end of the CBPP2 programme in October 2012, the ECB had bought only €16.4 
billion worth of covered bonds. The lack of covered bond issuance was the main reason 
why the CBPP2 was not implemented to its full size. (Bibow, 2015.) 
Securities Market Programme (SMP) 
Cour-Thimann and Winkler (2013) argue that as the European sovereign debt crisis 
began to influence the markets in early 2010, acute market expectations and worries 
about a possible Greek sovereign debt default with a further risk of impact on 
sovereign debts of Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain started to emerge. As a response, 
the ECB announced the Securities Market Programme (SMP) on 10th of May 2010 
which focused on buying government bonds from troubled euro countries. When 
announced, the ECB did not give any details about the size or the intended length of 
the SMP. 
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The SMP aroused disagreement amongst economists and critics of the SMP argued 
that the ECB was overstepping its mandate by buying government bonds (public debt) 
in secondary markets and that the bond purchases would not only undermine the 
ECB’s credibility, but also increase the inflationary pressures on the euro area. 
However, the ECB assured that the SMP was temporary and merely aimed to improve 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, which had suffered heavy distortions 
from the financial crisis. To distinguish the SMP from QE that the Fed was 
implementing in the U.S., the ECB decided to sterilize the SMP purchases with 
specific operations that were designed to reabsorb the injected liquidity. As result from 
the sterilization operations, the SMP purchases had no effect on the monetary policy 
stance of the ECB. 
The first round of SMP purchases was limited to the most problematic government 
bonds of the euro area: Greek, Irish and Portuguese. However, as the European 
sovereign debt crisis re-intensified, the ECB decided to implement a second round of 
SMP purchases in August 2011 and included also government bonds of Italy and Spain 
into the programme.  When market conditions began to normalize in early 2012, the 
ECB stopped the government bond purchases of SMP. Fratzscher et al. (2014) find 
that in February 2012 the ECB held around €220 billion worth of sovereign bonds of 
euro countries that were experiencing financial stress. The SMP programme was 
officially deactivated in September 2012 while it was replaced by a new programme 
called Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). 
Outright Monetary Transactions programme (OMT) 
The European sovereign debt crisis re-intensified once again in the summer of 2012, 
when the solvency of Italy and Spain became unsure. At this point the markets started 
to question the viability of the common currency, euro. As the possibility of euro area 
break up arose, Mario Draghi, the former president of the ECB, gave the famous 
speech on 26th of July 2012, where he stated: “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready 
to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” Swiftly 
after the speech, on 6th of September 2012, the ECB introduced the OMT programme, 
under which the ECB promised, if necessary, to purchase unlimited quantity of short-
term maturity government bonds issued by countries under the European Stability 
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Mechanism (ESM) macroeconomic adjustment programme or precautionary 
programme (Fratzscher et al., 2014).  
As the OMT programme included the possibility to buy unlimited amounts of 
government bonds of a financially distressed euro country, the ECB set strict 
conditions for the programme. To activate the OTM programme towards a specific 
country, four conditions had to be met. First, the country must have received financial 
support from ESM. Second, the government must comply with the reform efforts that 
are required by the respective ESM program. Third, the OMT programme can only 
start if the troubled country has regained complete access to private lending markets. 
Fourth, the country’s government bond yields are higher than what is justified based 
on the economic data of the country. As no country has yet met the strict requirements 
stated above, the OMT programme has not been activated (Acharya et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, Siekmann et al. (2015) remind that in addition to the fact that the OMT 
has not been used yet, even the legality of its usage has been discussed in courts.   
Expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP) 
The ECB faced political and legal opposition to asset purchases and undertook its first 
large QE programme in pursuit of monetary policy objectives in January 2015. The 
first QE programme of ECB goes with the name of Asset Purchase Programme, and it 
is still ongoing. The Asset Purchase Programme (APP) of ECB is an umbrella term for 
four different purchase programmes: The Third Covered Bond Purchase Programme 
(CBPP3), the Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP), the Public 
Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) and the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme 
(CSPP). 
ECB announced two new asset purchase programmes on 4th of September 2014: Third 
Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3) and Asset-Backed Securities Purchase 
Programme (ABSPP). When announced, the ECB did not provide any detailed 
information about the intended size of purchases under these programmes and they 
were subsequently incorporated into the APP programme. Although the ECB has 
already launched three purchase programmes that target specifically covered bonds, 
these programmes have resulted only in a modest increase in covered bond prices in 
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the euro area (Gibson et al., 2015). Under the ABSPP the ECB buys Asset-Backet 
Securities directly from banks with an aim to free up their balance sheets and boost 
lending to euro area businesses. 
On 22nd of January, the ECB decided that asset purchases should be expanded and 
included the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) under ongoing programmes. 
At the same time, the ECB shed a light on the overall size of its purchase programmes 
and announced that CBPP3, ABSPP and PSPP form APP and that the combined 
monthly purchases of APP will start from March 2015 with €60 billion. PSPP includes 
securities with a residual maturity ranging from 1 to 30 years and the allocation of 
purchases goes as follows: 90% to government bonds and 10% to securities issued by 
international organizations and multilateral development banks (Lehment, 2018). As 
PSPP identifies as QE, it has had a significant effect on the size of the ECB’s balance 
sheet. 
Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) is the latest sub-programme of APP 
and was introduced to the public on 10th of March 2016 with initial monthly purchases 
of €20 billion. The CSPP is a decentralized programme and aims to bypass the banking 
sector by transmitting monetary policy stimulus directly to the non-bank sector. This 
is done by purchasing bonds and commercial paper issued by non-financial 
corporations located in euro area countries. 
Even though the programmes of APP differ considerably by size and scope they also 
share common features. Firstly, all APP programmes are open-ended and are intended 
to continue until the ECB sees the inflation rate back on a sustainable track close to 
2%. Secondly, since the ECB is not owned by the national government but by all the 
National Central Banks from each member state, the majority of asset purchases under 
APP are conducted in the domestic market of each National Central Bank according 
to the respective capital shares in ECB. (Urbschat & Watzka, 2020.) Table 1 below 
summarizes each individual programme of APP indicating that the PSPP is by far the 
largest. 
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Table 1. APP overview.  Monthly net purchases and holdings in the end of 2020. 
Program   Monthly net purchases Total holdings* In percent First purchases 
CBPP3   1 529 287 545 9.88 October 2014 
ABSPP   -656 29 497 1.01 November 2014 
PSPP   17 822 2 341 607 80.49 March 2015 
CSPP   2 378 250 403 8.62 June 2016 
           
APP   21 073 2 909 052 100   
* At amortized cost, in EUR millions, at month-end December 2020   
The APP net purchases were carried out until the end of 2018 with a total amount of 
€2.6 trillion. However, given an unexpected slowdown in the euro area economy, the 
ECB decided to restart the APP on 12th of September 2019 with a monthly pace of €20 
billion starting from November 2019. The Governing Council of the ECB expects APP 
purchases to continue until the ECB starts to raise its key interest rates once again.  
Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) 
The global pandemic, Covid-19, froze the world economy during 2020. Although the 
ECB had already restarted the APP in the last quarter of 2019, it soon became clear 
that the APP itself was not sufficient enough to respond to the economic shock caused 
by the pandemic. On 18th of March 2020 the ECB announced that it will start a new 
temporary asset purchase programme, Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme 
(PEPP), with an aim to support the liquidity and the financial conditions of all sectors 
of the euro area economy. Initial size of the PEPP was announced to be €750 billion 
and the purchases were targeted to securities from both the private and public sectors.  
5.2 Event study methodology 
The objective of an event study is to assess the extent to which market participants can 
earn excess or abnormal stock returns from an event that carries new information to 
the market. The abnormal return is the difference between the observed return and the 
expected return in the absence of the event. (Sorescu, et al., 2017.) Event studies often 
examine firm specific announcements (e.g., the appointment of new CEO) or 
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announcements made by regulatory bodies (e.g., ECB), and are widely deployed on 
the fields of accounting, finance and economics. Underlying event study methodology 
is a semi-strong form of market efficiency, which makes following assumptions: 1) 
stock prices reflect all publicly available information and 2) stock prices instantly 
change to reflect new information when it becomes available (Fama, 1970). Following 
subsections represent the event study methodology in more detail and the descriptions 
and formulas are based on a study by MacKinlay (1997). 
5.2.1 Events of interest 
As this thesis aims to capture the pure announcement effect, the event days are the 
days, when the Governing Council of ECB first introduced each purchase programme 
to the public instead of the days when the programmes have actually started (e.g., first 
purchases made under each). Events of interests are explained in more detail in 
subchapter 5.1.2.  
Table 2. Events of interest. 
n Event date   Programme 
Part of APP 
(X = yes) Initial size Type 
1. 2009-05-07   CBPP1   €60 billion total Credit Easing 
2. 2010-05-10   SMP   Not specified Credit Easing 
3. 2011-10-03   CBPP2   €40 billion total Credit Easing 
4. 2012-09-06   OMT   Not specified Credit Easing 
5. 2014-09-04   CBPP3 & ABSPP X Not specified Credit Easing 
6. 2015-01-22   PSPP X *€60 billion monthly Quantitative Easing 
7. 2016-03-10   CSPP X €20 billion monthly Credit Easing 
8. 2019-09-12   APP restart   €20 billion monthly Quantitative Easing 
9. 2020-03-18   PEPP   €750 billion total Quantitative Easing 
* Monthly purchases of PSPP, CBPP3 and ABSPP were combined to cover €60 billion monthly  
 
5.2.2 Estimation period and event window 
To conduct an event study, an event window and estimation period are selected. The 
day of the announcement is the event day and is thus defined as t = 0.  Three-day event 
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window of [-1, +1] is used in order to capture the short-term effects of the 
announcement. Taking one day prior to the event day allows the fact that investors and 
other market participants often have rational expectations and anticipations 
considering the magnitude of the upcoming announcement. Including plus one day 
after the event to the event window allows for the fact that it can take some time before 
the market adapts to the announcement made on the event day. Moreover, MacKinlay 
(1997) recommends the usage of a three-day event window of [-1, +1].  
Although estimation period is often relatively long, Sorokina et al. (2013) remind that 
there is no uniform agreement on the length of the estimation period. As such, a 
relatively short estimation period of 30 days is chosen, as by choosing a short 
estimation period, the normal market behavior right before the announcement is better 
recorded. As the estimation period should be defined prior to the event window, and 
any overlapping with the event window should be avoided, the 30-day estimation 
period for this study is thus [-32, -2].  
 
  Estimation window   
Event 
window   
              
          ED   
                                -2 -1 0  +1 
                
                
Figure 7. Estimation window and event window. 
 
5.2.3 Measuring normal returns 
Normal return of a stock represents a theoretical or expected return under 
circumstances, where the event is not occurring. In this study, stock indices are used 
instead of individual stocks, so in the context of this study stock = index. The 




is called abnormal return (AR). To clarify, AR is the return difference (be it positive 
or negative) between a stock’s actual return and normal return. As such, for stock i and 
event date t, the abnormal return, 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡, is the difference between the stock’s actual 
return 𝑅𝑖,𝑡, and the expected return 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡|𝑋𝑡) at time t: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡|𝑋𝑡) (1) 
where 𝑋𝑡 represents the conditioning information at time t. In order to calculate 
abnormal returns, the normal return must be modelled. MacKinlay (1997) presents 
three popular ways to model the normal return: 1) the constant mean return model, 2) 
the market model and 3) the adjusted market model. From these models the constant 
mean return model is chosen as the study is done by comparing index against itself in 
order to distinguish possible significant abnormal return patterns around the event. 
Should the comparison be specific stock against index, the market model and its 
variations would be used. Although the constant mean return model is conceivably the 
simplest model for event study, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) find that it often 
yields results that are similar to the results of more sophisticated models. 
Constant mean return model assumes that the normal return for stock i can be 
calculated simply by computing the mean return from the past returns of the stock: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
𝐸 (𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 0)  𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return of stock i at time t, 𝜇𝑖 is the mean return for the stock i and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
is the disturbance term for stock i at time t with an expectation of zero and variance 
𝜎𝜀𝑖
2 . 
5.2.4 Measuring abnormal returns 
 As expressed in Formula 1, the abnormal return of a stock is simply the return 
difference between the stock’s actual and normal return. In theory, if no events occur, 
50 
the abnormal return of a stock should be zero. The formula for estimating abnormal 
returns when the constant mean model is applied to measure the normal return is: 




 ∑ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑡∈[𝑇0,𝑇1] . 
The abnormal return in the event window is the return of stock i on day t minus the 
average return of stock i in the estimation period. As the aim of this thesis is to 
determine, whether the ECB’s unconventional purchase programme announcements 
create measurable and statistically significant short-term abnormal return (with three-
day event window and 30-day estimation period), the daily average abnormal returns 
(AARs) for the chosen indices, STOXX 600 Europe and S&P 500, are calculated for 
each day in the event window. The formula for calculating the stocks’ average 








5.2.5 Measuring cumulative abnormal returns 
The observations of abnormal returns are collected and accumulated to conduct more 
comprehensive analysis of the event of interests. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
across the event window 𝑡1 to 𝑡2 for stock i is the sum of the ARs included in the event 
window: 




Similarly, the average abnormal returns (AARs) can be further applied to be 
accumulated over the event window 𝑡1 to 𝑡2 by using the following formula of 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR): 
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The CAARs are calculated to analyze whether the returns are abnormal and 
generalizable (i.e., including all chosen events of interest) during specified periods. 
This means that, in the context of this study, the CAARs show whether cumulative 
abnormal returns for STOXX Europe 600 and S&P 500 are found between the chosen 
three-day event window of [-1, +1] and whether the cumulative abnormal return during 
the event window is generalizable among the events of interest. 
5.2.6 Measuring the statistical significance 
To get reliable results, it is crucial to test whether the estimated abnormal returns are 
statistically different from zero or not. In order to make conclusions considering the 
statistical significance of the abnormality, two hypotheses are set: null hypothesis 
(𝐻0), which states that the abnormal returns of chosen indices around the events are 
zero, and opposing alternate hypothesis (𝐻1), which states that the abnormal returns 
around the events differ from zero (i.e., there are measurable abnormal returns): 
𝑯𝟎: 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 = 0 
𝑯𝟏: 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ≠ 0 
If the null hypothesis is accepted, it means that there are no measurable announcement 
effect and if the alternate hypothesis is accepted it means that measurable 
announcement effect is found. There are several test statistics that can be used to 
measure the statistical significance of the results and to determine, which of the two 
hypotheses presented above is accepted. Significance tests can be divided into two 
broad categories: 1) parametric and 2) nonparametric tests. The key difference is that 
parametric tests assume that abnormal returns are normally distributed, whereas 
nonparametric tests do not make such assumptions. Parametric tests are based on the 
widely known method called the t-test. Subsequently, scholars have developed 
variations from the t-test to fix the prediction error of the t-test. Boehmer, Musumeci 
and Poulsen (1991) argue that there are dilemmas related to the frequently used 
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methods for measuring the statistical significance (e.g., Chi-Square, sign test and t-
tests). They state that the dilemmas are caused by the variance occurred due to the 
event which causes these frequently used methods to reject the null hypothesis too 
often and incorrectly. Consequently, Boehmer et al. (1991) present a modified 
standardized cross-sectional method called the BMP-test. Differing from the t-test, the 
BMP-test is robust to the variance induced by the event. However, Kolari and 
Pynnönen (2010) find that the BMP-test ignores cross-section correlation and propose 
a modification to the BMP-test which takes account of the cross-sectional correlation. 
The modification is called the adjusted BMP-test and it is robust to the problems with 
the standard t-test - variance changes and cross-correlation. This thesis uses the 
adjusted BMP-test proposed by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) to evaluate the 
significance of the abnormal returns of the event window.  
5.2.7 Possible problems with event studies 
Event studies are dependent on the ability to measure the size of the surprise. Chosen 
events should not be anticipated ones to receive statistically significant results from 
them. As stock markets are always anticipating and speculating upcoming events 
(especially macroeconomic news), arguably some of the latter events can be rather 
anticipated ones than pure surprises. Furthermore, as transparency is one of the key 
factors for central banks, they often endeavor to avoid surprising the markets and as 
such, the challenge to event studies is even greater. However, the abnormal market 
conditions after the financial crisis have forced central banks to make quick policy 
decisions that have not been fully anticipated by the market. To continue with, as the 
subject (e.g., size, time span and targeted assets) of ECB’s purchase programmes 
varies a lot, even the functioning markets often fail to forecast the exact announcement. 
In this sense, the possibility of surprise arises. In comparison, the market is able to 
anticipate changes in interest rates rather well, and thus, the conventional interest rate 
policy does not usually come as a surprise. 
Another challenge for event studies involves the measuring period: How to carefully 
choose appropriate estimation window and event window. To overcome these 
challenges, a relatively short estimation period is chosen to avoid overlapping 
macroeconomic news that might bias the results. For asset purchase programmes, the 
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event days are the dates, when the purchase programmes have been initially announced 
to the public (so-called first announcements). The importance of choice of event dates 
is obvious and has been recognized widely in event studies (see for example Gagnon 











Table 3 presents the average abnormal returns (AARs) and the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAARs) around the short-term event window of [-1,1]. Moreover, 
the relative adjusted BMP-test statistics are also presented in Table 3. As the results 
shown in Table 3 are averages, they cover all of the ECB purchase programme 
announcements that have occurred within the reference period (see Table 2).  
Table 3. Average abnormal returns around short-term event window. 
                
STOXX Europe 600   S&P 500 
Event days AAR Adjusted BMP     Event days AAR Adjusted BMP 
-1 0.18% -0.011     -1 0.63% 0.230 
0 0.56% 1.189     0 -0.10% 0.855 
+1 0.69% 0.973     +1 0.81% 2.295** 
                
  CAAR         CAAR   
-1 ; +1 1.43% 3.335***     -1 ; +1 1.34% 2.275** 
                
-1 ; +1 = Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) of 3-day event window 
*** = Statistically significant at the 1% level       
** = Statistically significant at the 5% level       
* = Statistically significant at the 10% level     
 
Excluding the event day 0 for S&P 500, AARs for individual event days yield positive 
abnormal returns. As the stock markets in the euro area close earlier than the ones in 
the U.S., S&P 500 has more time to react to ECB’s purchase programme 
announcements than STOXX Europe 600 on event day 0 (the actual day of the 
announcement). From the results in Table 2, we can interpret that as the AAR of event 
day 0 for S&P 500 is -0.10%, the U.S. stock market tracks the intraday effect of ECB’s 
purchase programme announcement on the domestic stock markets of the euro area. 
Because S&P 500 has more time to digest the ECB’s announcement, the intraday stock 
market reaction of event day 0 is practically non-existent and statistically insignificant. 
However, the AAR of S&P 500 on event day 1 is 0.81% and statistically significant at 
5% significance level. Again, it seems that S&P 500 monitors the euro market and 
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confirms that the ECB’s purchase programme announcement was good news for the 
market. When viewing AARs as a whole, we see that the stock market requires a little 
time to process the new information provided by the ECB as no instant intraday 
abnormal return that would be statistically significant is observed. 
The CAAR of the three-day event window cumulates to 1.43% for STOXX Europe 
600 and to 1.34% for S&P 500. Furthermore, the adjusted BMP-test shows that 
CAARs are statistically significant. The CAAR for STOXX Europe 600 is statistically 
significant at 1% confidence level (Adjusted BMP-test value 3.335), and the CAAR 
for S&P 500 is statistically significant at 5% confidence level (Adjusted BMP-test 
value 2.275). What is more, these already strong results are strengthened further with 
the fact that when an event study has relatively few events of interests (nine in this 
case), also the lower confidence level, the 10% level, is often accepted. As such, we 
reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternate hypothesis H1: abnormal returns 
around events ≠ 0. The announcement effect of ECB’s purchase programmes is 
distinguishable on [-1,1] event window and yields positive abnormal returns for both 
STOXX Europe 600 and S&P 500. 
Based on these results, we can answer to the research questions 2) to 5): 
2) ECB’s asset purchase programme announcements have statistically significant 
announcement effect on STOXX Europe 600 and S&P 500. 
3) The announcement effect creates positive short-term abnormal returns. 
4) Both the European and the U.S. stock markets respond to ECB’s unconventional 
monetary policy announcements in a similar way on an index level. 
5) Even though the results do not indicate significant and instant intraday 
announcement effect, we can accept the semi-strong form of market efficiency as the 
cumulative abnormal return pattern on [-1,1] event window is so evident and 
statistically significant. Furthermore, the international integration and co-movement 
between the European and the U.S. stock markets exists as the chosen indices, STOXX 
Europe 600 and S&P 500, yield similar results. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
In Europe and the United States, the critical turning point for monetary policy was the 
global financial crisis of 2008. Disruptions in the financial markets, notably in the 
banking sector, and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in Europe sank global 
economies into deep recession, well beyond what could be managed by conventional 
monetary policies. After the ECB and Fed cut short-term interest rates to zero (or 
nearly so) these central banks turned to unconventional monetary policy tools, 
especially to balance sheet policies, in order to provide stimulus to the distressed 
markets. 
Motivated by the current popularity of monetary easing through balance sheet policies, 
this thesis aims to examine, whether the ECB’s asset purchase programme 
announcements lead to a short-term stock market reaction or not. A number of 
researchers have shown how monetary policy announcements have a significant 
impact on stock market returns, however, these studies have been mainly local 
meaning they have focused on the announcement effect between a central bank and its 
domestic markets. This paper aims to fill that gap by comparing the supposed 
announcement effect between the domestic index STOXX Europe 600 and the foreign 
index S&P 500. Furthermore, previous studies often focus on a specific series of 
purchase programme announcements whereas this study takes all of the ECB’s asset 
purchase programmes (and one relaunch) that have been introduced since the financial 
crisis into account. By doing so, we can form a timeline which carries more than a 
decade and on which the events of interest are scattered quite evenly (see Table 2).  
Results of this thesis do not show the long-term effects of monetary policy 
announcements to the stock markets as event studies, by their nature, capture market 
reactions over only a short time-period. However, throughout this thesis, it is shown 
how loose monetary policy (low interest rates and liquidity injections through asset 
purchases) allocates money through monetary transmission mechanism to stock 
markets and to other asset classes. Moreover, the positive correlation between central 
banks’ balance sheets and stock market development is shown through monetary 
transmission mechanism and discussion. 
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Furthermore, the announcement effect of ECB’s asset purchase programmes is proved 
with the event study approach. Announcements of asset purchase programmes yield 
positive abnormal returns for STOXX Europe 600 and S&P 500. Cumulative abnormal 
returns around the three-day event window are clear and significant. However, no 
intraday effect is detected. Efficient market hypothesis and internal integration and co-
movement of stock markets are in line with the results and thus provide a theoretical 
basis for the findings of this thesis. 
To sum the monetary policy direction, Constâncio (2017) asks rightly whether the 
balance sheet measures adopted by major central banks during the financial crisis 
should remain as permanent parts of the central bank toolkit and continues by stating 
that the need for these new measures stem from structural changes that have occurred 
in financial markets. Recently, balance sheet policies were adapted to an 
unprecedented extent in order to respond to the economic shock from Covid-19 
pandemic (see Figure 3 and compare the year-end size of balance sheets between 2019 
and 2020). Furthermore, the recessionary supply shock from Covid-19 pandemic was 
exogenic and derived from imposed restrictions and the sudden economic stagnation 
that followed it, but in terms of monetary policy, it was treated with the same medicine 
than the financial crisis, which was endogenic shock.  
Finally, to answer the research question 1) It seems that we are witnessing a 
paradigmatic change in central banking when the toolkit once described as 
unconventional is now the primary toolkit for central banks to guide the economy. As 
long as central banks continue stimulative monetary policy by keeping the asset 
purchase programmes rolling in a low interest rate environment and the transmission 
channels of monetary policy remain strong, in the absence of alternatives, we can 
expect the high valuation of stock markets to continue.  
Recommendations for future research include the evaluation of unconventional 
monetary policy tools under normal market conditions, not distressed times. What 
long-term effects the central banks’ Covid-19 monetary easing through balance sheet 
policies creates on the global economy? Unlike the recovery from the financial crisis, 
the Covid-19 recovery seems like a V-shaped recovery at least in terms of stock prices 
(see Figure 5 and Figure 6). Furthermore, as the amount of money in the economy has 
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risen to record heights, while the inflation targets do not appear to be achievable at all, 
it is reasonable to question, whether the current situation is stable or not? What is 
certain, however, is that it is a burning topic under debate.  
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Appendix 1. List of ECB Refinancing Rate changes. 
Changes in ECB Refinancing Rate 01/2008 - 12/2020 
n Date   Type 
Magnitude 
(percentage points) 
ECB Refinancing Rate  
after the change 
1. 2008-07-03   Rate increase +0.25 4.25 
2. 2008-10-08   Rate decrease -0.50 3.75 
3. 2008-11-06   Rate decrease -0.50 3.25 
4. 2008-12-04   Rate decrease -0.75 2.50 
5. 2009-01-15   Rate decrease -0.50 2.00 
6. 2009-03-05   Rate decrease -0.50 1.50 
7. 2009-04-02   Rate decrease -0.25 1.25 
8. 2009-05-07   Rate decrease -0.25 1.00 
9. 2011-04-07   Rate increase +0.25 1.25 
10. 2011-07-07   Rate increase +0.25 1.50 
11. 2011-11-03   Rate decrease -0.25 1.25 
12. 2011-12-08   Rate decrease -0.25 1.00 
13. 2012-07-05   Rate decrease -0.25 0.75 
14. 2013-05-02   Rate decrease -0.25 0.50 
15. 2013-11-07   Rate decrease -0.25 0.25 
16. 2014-06-05   Rate decrease -0.10 0.15 
17. 2014-09-04   Rate decrease -0.10 0.05 
18. 2016-03-16   Rate decrease -0.05 0.00 









Appendix 2. List of Federal Funds Target Rate changes. 
Changes in Federal Funds Target Rate 01/2008 - 12/2020 
n Date   Type 
Magnitude 
(percentage points) 
Fed Funds Target Rate  
after the change 
1. 2008-01-22   Rate decrease -0.75 3.50 
2. 2008-01-30   Rate decrease -0.50 3.00 
3. 2008-03-18   Rate decrease -0.75 2.25 
4. 2008-04-30   Rate decrease -0.25 2.00 
5. 2008-10-08   Rate decrease -0.50 1.50 
6. 2008-10-29   Rate decrease -0.50 1.00 
7. 2008-12-16   Rate decrease -0.75 0.25 
8. 2015-12-16   Rate increase +0.25 0.50 
9. 2016-12-14   Rate increase +0.25 0.75 
10. 2017-03-15   Rate increase +0.25 1.00 
11. 2017-06-14   Rate increase +0.25 1.25 
12. 2017-12-13   Rate increase +0.25 1.50 
13. 2018-03-21   Rate increase +0.25 1.75 
14. 2018-06-13   Rate increase +0.25 2.00 
15. 2018-09-26   Rate increase +0.25 2.25 
16. 2018-12-19   Rate increase +0.25 2.50 
17. 2019-07-31   Rate decrease -0.25 2.25 
18. 2019-09-18   Rate decrease -0.25 2.00 
19. 2019-10-30   Rate decrease -0.25 1.75 
20. 2020-03-04   Rate decrease -0.50 1.25 
21. 2020-03-18   Rate decrease -1.00 0.25 
            
 
